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Credit scoring is a tool used to make lending decisions.  AgChoice Farm Credit has 
a dealer financing program called Farm Credit Express that makes lending decisions based 
on a scoring model.  Farm Credit Express is a dealer financing option for farm equipment 
purchases.  AgChoice has generated significant loan volume with this program but has also 
experienced challenges with loan delinquencies as field staff must service loans that they 
did not originate.   
This thesis evaluates loan delinquencies within AgChoice Farm Credit’s Farm 
Credit Express (“FCE”) program.  The thesis develops a regression model that includes 
delinquencies as the dependent variable and Total AgChoice Borrowing, Original Loan 
Amount, Farming Segment, CBI Score, AgScore, and FCE Only as the independent 
variables.  The model provides an examination of AgChoice’s Farm Credit Express 
delinquencies and evaluates the variables mentioned above and their ability to predict 
delinquencies.  
 
 The results showed that Total AgChoice Borrowing, Original Loan Amount, CBI 
Score and FCE only were statistically significant independent variables.  Based on results 
of the model, recommendations were made to potentially reduce future delinquencies in the 
Farm Credit Express loan portfolio.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
AgChoice Farm Credit (“AgChoice”) is a $1.8 Billion agricultural lending 
association and is part of the Farm Credit System, a nationwide lending cooperative.  
AgChoice offers a comprehensive range of financial services to full-time and part-time 
farmers in a chartered territory including 52 counties in central, western and northern 
Pennsylvania along with four counties in West Virginia.  AgChoice’s primary focus is 
loans with the majority of its revenue from interest income.  Over the last decade, 
AgChoice has continued to diversify and offer additional financial services to its customer-
owners including consulting, accounting, and record-keeping offerings.  AgChoice is 
continually pursing ways to improve efficiencies and better serve its customers.   
One of the most successful new programs for AgChoice is Farm Credit Express.  
Several years ago, AgChoice collaborated with Mid-Atlantic Farm Credit, another 
association within the Farm Credit System, to offer its Farm Credit Express (“FCE”) dealer 
financing program to AgChoice customer-owners.  Farm Credit Express has partnered with 
over 1,000 equipment dealership locations across the Mid-Atlantic region to offer a Farm 
Credit dealer financing option.  This program is designed to compete with other dealer 
financing options such as John Deere Financial with quick decisions (goal of 20 minutes), 
low rates and easy execution.  Dealers use the Farm Credit Express Program because it is 
an alternative financing option with no recourse – meaning that once the loan is booked to 
AgChoice, the dealership has no requirements in helping to collect the loan.  The dealer 
handles the application that is submitted to Mid-Atlantic for approval and processing.  
AgChoice employees get an email notification when a FCE loan has been approved for one 
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of their customers.  AgChoice pays Mid-Atlantic a servicing fee and all new loans are 
booked directly to AgChoice’s loan portfolio.  
Currently AgChoice’s FCE portfolio is $62 million, which is relatively minor 
compared to total association loan assets of $1.8 billion.  There have been some obvious 
benefits to AgChoice with the FCE program.  AgChoice is getting loan volume that 
historically would have likely gone to other trade credit.  In addition, there are new 
customers exposed to AgChoice Farm Credit.  FCE is a great tool to get prospects exposed 
to AgChoice and proceed to develop a larger, long-term lending relationship.  AgChoice 
has also been able to reduce its servicing costs by encouraging customers who are inquiring 
for small equipment loans to use the FCE program.  This reduces the servicing on small 
loans that are less profitable for the association.   
The negative impact of the FCE program is that it appears to branch staff that FCE 
loans have a higher delinquency rate compared to the rest of AgChoice’s portfolio.  This 
puts extra stress and frustration on AgChoice field staff as they are trying to manage 
delinquencies to borrowers that “they don’t even know” or “didn’t even make the loan to.”   
This thesis will compare FCE delinquencies to the entire AgChoice portfolio and 
evaluate data from the FCE portfolio to determine if there is a correlation between certain 
variables and FCE delinquencies.  From an association level, the benefits of the FCE 
program outweigh the additional servicing on delinquencies.  Over the past two years, 
managing FCE delinquencies has been particularly difficult for the field staff and that is 




CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
When it comes to agriculture financing opportunities, farm equipment is the second 
largest asset on a producer’s balance sheet, following real estate.  For the Farm Credit 
System, equipment financing is a significant portion of its portfolio.  Financing for 
equipment can be provided through direct portfolio lending from individual Farm Credit 
Associations or through dealer financing programs such as Farm Credit Express (Koenig 
2016).  When borrowers finance equipment through dealer financing programs, typically 
that loan decision is made via a credit scoring model. 
Credit scoring is a tool lenders use to assess risk in the loan application based on a 
comprehensive evaluation.  A borrower’s application information along with information 
collected from credit reporting agencies are entered into an automated underwriting system.  
The system evaluates all of this information to determine the probability that this loan will 
repay as agreed (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 1998).  This method generates a 
“score” that lenders can use to rank borrowers relative to the risk profile of the applicant.  
Lenders develop a scoring model, or “scorecard,” that is built by evaluating historical data 
on the repayment of existing or formerly made loans to determine which borrower 
characteristics are valuable in predicting whether the loan paid as agreed (Mester 1997).  
Information used in the scoring model is acquired through borrower loan 
applications and from credit bureau agencies.  Many factors including but not limited to 
borrower’s income, current debt levels, years in business, and historical repayment 
performance may indicate loan repayment and be used in the scorecard process.  
Regression analysis relating loan performance to collected variables is used to determine 
the combination of factors that forecast repayment issues and how much weight should be 
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given to each variable.  It is likely that some of the factors the developer of the model 
begins with will not make it into the final model (Mester 1997). 
Fair, Isaac & Co., a leading developer of scoring models, developed one of the most 
used scoring models.  The scores range from 400 to 900 and are known as FICO scores.  A 
higher score indicates less risk for the lender.  Fair, Isaac & Co. surveyed one million loan 
records and found that one in eight borrowers with a FICO score below 600 was either 
severely delinquent or in default on their loan.  On the other hand, if borrowers had a score 
over 800, only one in 1,300 had similar repayment issues (Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis 1998).  In general when someone references “your score,” they are referring to your 
FICO score.  However, FICO is not the only score used to make lending decisions.  Many 
lenders use their own scores, but often incorporate FICO scores into their scoring model 
along with other borrower information.  In addition, while FICO scores are the most 
commonly used, there are other credit bureau scores available (Indiana Department of 
Financial Institutions n.d.). 
Most scoring models follow the same logic of the FICO score, higher scores predict 
a lower risk to the lender.  Typically a lending institution sets a cutoff score based on the 
amount of risk it is willing to carry.  Following the model, the lender would approve 
applicants with scores above cutoff and deny scores below cutoff.  Often times, lenders will 
take a closer look at loan applications that generate a score close to cutoff before approving 
or denying the loan request. No model is perfect: some accounts that default received 
higher scores than accounts with no repayment issues (Mester 1997). 
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Historically in small communities, loans were made based on word of mouth who 
paid their debts and who did not.  As creditors became larger and the number of 
applications increased, the lending system needed to develop a more systematic and 
efficient way to make lending decisions (Indiana Department of Financial Institutions n.d.).  
Credit scoring was first used in the auto loan and consumer credit industries but is now 
used for all types of lending including residential and business lending (Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis 1998).  
One of the largest benefits to credit scoring is that it greatly reduces the time needed 
in the loan approval process.  Credit scoring can reduce loan analysis time to well under an 
hour when historically loan applicants could wait up to two weeks to know if their loan was 
approved or denied. This time savings not only benefits the customer but results in cost 
savings for the lender as well.  Even if a lender does not want to depend solely on credit 
scoring for loan decisions, scoring can increase lender efficiency by allowing staff to spend 
more time working with borderline borrowers (Mester 1997).  
Credit scoring has also increased objectivity in lending decisions.  By using 
uniform standards when assessing a borrower’s credit factors, credit scores help make sure 
that all applicants are on a level playing field (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 1998).  
Use of a credit scoring model allows lenders to apply the same underwriting criteria to all 
applicants regardless of race, gender, or other factors that are illegal from being used in 
credit decisions (Mester 1997). 
The growing use of credit scoring is leading to increased competition in the lending 
industry, particularly for small-business lending.  Historically, lenders to small businesses 
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have been smaller lending institutions, like community banks, that have a physical branch 
presence in the community.  Credit scoring is changing the way lenders make small-
business loans.  Large lending institutions have entered the market by using automated and 
centralized processing of loan applications and now determine lending decisions based on a 
credit scoring model.  Now, large lending institutions are able to generate significant 
volumes of small-business loans even in areas where they do not have extensive branch 
networks (Mester 1997).   
By utilizing a credit scoring model, the Farm Credit System is able to compete with 
dealer financing options such as John Deere Financial and CNH Industrial Capital for 
equipment financing.  AgChoice uses a credit scoring model called “AgScore” in all of its 
loan applications. For Farm Credit Express loans, if the loan amount is under $250,000, 
then decision for approval or denial is based only on the AgScore.   
2.1 Other Research  
 There has been significant research completed on agricultural credit scoring 
models.  This thesis will review the results of research conducted by Ellinger, Splett, and 
Barry. The primary objective of their study was to measure the characteristics and 
consistency of credit scoring models used by agricultural lenders (Ellinger, Splett and 
Barry 1992). 
 Ellinger, Splett and Barry (1992) suggest that credit scoring models vary for three 
main reasons.  First, lenders use credit scoring models for different motives.  Some lenders 
use their credit scoring model along with other financial information to determine loan 
approval while some lenders rely solely on the model for loan decisions without 
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considering other financial factors.  Models may differ depending if they are used only for 
loan approval, loan pricing, or a combination of both loan approval and pricing.  When 
using a model to make loan approval decisions, the model focuses on acceptable versus 
unacceptable loans.  There is no varying levels of acceptance.  When using a model to 
make loan pricing decisions, the model focuses on categorizing acceptable loans into 
groups based on varying levels of risk (Ellinger, Splett and Barry 1992). 
 The second reason credit scoring models may be different is the varying risk 
tolerance of lending institutions.  A risk-tolerant lender will have more liberal risk 
classifications while a risk-averse lender will be more conservative.  Loan demand and 
competition may also influence a lender to become more liberal with their credit scoring 
model (Ellinger, Splett and Barry 1992). 
 Third, credit scoring models may vary because of specific borrower characteristics 
and quality of information provided to individual lenders.  Certain geographical regions 
with specific farm types may have models with performance measures and interval ranges 
that are applicable to specific types of borrowers.  In addition, credit scoring models may 
vary based on lender experience using credit scoring models and the quality of financial 
data provided by loan applicants.  Models may be based on the information producers have 
available versus the measures that most accurately predict creditworthiness (Ellinger, Splett 
and Barry 1992).   
 Credit scoring model results impact borrowers availability and/or cost of financing.  
Inconsistencies in agricultural credit scoring models would suggest that certain borrowers 
might have a competitive advantage in obtaining credit.  Ellinger, Splett, and Barry (1992) 
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observed the results of 87 credit scoring models using 324 different loan cases.  Two 
approaches were used to evaluate the consistency between the credit scoring models.  The 
first approach detects the types of loan cases that result in consistent or inconsistent scores.  
This approach compared the correlation between the varying loan cases.  The second 
approach identifies the credit scoring models that show consistent or inconsistent rank.  
This approach compares each model’s ranking of the 324 loan cases.  An equal ranking of 
the 324 loan cases by the 87 models would indicate model consistency (Ellinger, Splett and 
Barry 1992).   
 The first approach resulted in 52,326 unique correlation coefficients.  Only 6.5% of 
the correlations are over 0.90, while 28.56% are below 0.50.  This indicates inconsistency 
in the models.  The second approach compares each bank’s ranking of the 324 loan cases.  
The coefficient of concordance for the 87 banks’ ranking of the 324 loan cases is 0.87.  
While the rankings are positively correlated, significant differences exist within the ranks.  
For example, two bank models ranked a loan case with strong solvency and liquidity but 
weak profitability and management as 33rd and 283rd (Ellinger, Splett and Barry 1992). 
 Ellinger, Splett and Barry’s results indicated that there was a need to address the 
lack of a uniform credit scoring model for agricultural lenders.  Improvement has been 
made across the agricultural lending industry but it is unlikely that individual lenders credit 
scoring models will be 100% consistent.  It is expected that lenders with a higher risk 
tolerance will have a model that approves a loan for the same borrower that a more 




 The credit scoring model for Farm Credit Express loans determines loan approval 
or denial.  Pricing is the same for all loans that are approved.  CNH Industrial Capital 
(“CNH”) has often approved loans that were denied through the Farm Credit Express 
program but at a significantly higher interest rate than offered through Farm Credit 
Express.  This indicates that CNH’s credit scoring model determines loan approval and 
loan pricing. 
In addition to determining loan approval and loan pricing, credit scoring models can 
be used to assign probability of default.  There has been research completed on probability 
of default in the Farm Credit System.  This thesis will review the results of research by 
Featherstone, Roessler and Barry as well as Featherstone, Wilson, and Zollinger.  
Featherstone, Roessler and Barry (2006) noted that nearly all lenders used some 
type of risk-rating system.  Many systems include two ratings – one for the probability of 
default (PD) and one for the amount of potential loss given that default occurs.  Lenders 
have their own definitions of risk and risk ratings.  The lack of consistency increases the 
difficulty of uniformly assessing the risk held by agricultural lenders.  The objective of 
Featherstone, Roessler and Barry’s research was to develop a consistent risk-rating system 
with improved granularity using data from the Seventh Farm Credit District (Featherstone 
2006).  
 Featherstone, Roessler and Barry’s (2006) research utilized historical financial 
origination ratios based on the lenders current underwriting standards.  The ratios included 
were repayment capacity, solvency, liquidity and collateral.  Loans approved using 
scorecard systems were not included in the data.  Given that scorecard-approved loans do 
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not have traditional origination ratios, they cannot be analyzed in the same model as 
traditionally approved loans (Featherstone 2006). 
 Featherstone, Roessler and Barry (2006) classified each loan into ten risk 
categories.  The PD for each loan is determined from an equation derived from binary logit 
regression models estimated from loan origination data.  The models result in a PD 
assignment for each loan.  The loans were then mapped to a similar PD grid of S&P 
publicly rated firms.  This mapping allows lenders to know the characteristics of loans in 
each risk-rating category that they can then use to develop benchmarks for each risk-rating 
class (Featherstone 2006). 
 Results indicated that all of the variables were statistically significant at the 99.99% 
level.  Using a cutoff of 2% for classifying default, the model accurately predicted 65.4% 
of the loans that would default.  Logit results were used to map the loans into ten risk-rating 
classes based on an adaption of S&P reported probabilities of default for their 17 risk-rating 
categories. S&P is a model that has been established and validated and provides 
consistency in the marketplace.  Buyers of Farm Credit System loans and other securities 
will better understand the risk in the portfolio of loans if it is equated to S&P ratings.  
Based on the model, 35.4% of all loans in the portfolio would be in a S&P class nine and 
11.6% in S&P class ten.  This is a significant percentage of loans that are expected to enter 
a problem or adverse risk-rating class.  The high percentage of loans in classes nine and ten 
suggests that the Farm Credit System may want to increase the granularity of their risk 
ratings or modify the category definitions (Featherstone 2006).   
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 Featherstone, Wilson and Zollinger (2017) focused their research on the migration 
of accounts across the association’s currently established PD rating categories with 
negative movement being a predecessor to potential loan default.  The data consisted of 
17,943 observations between 2006 and 2012 and contained various fields of data including 
balance sheet date, earnings statement date and PD rating as of the statement date.  OLS 
regression was used to evaluate the data to determine how the current period PD rating and 
component ratios influenced the PD rating one year, three years and five years out.  
Independent variables are the current PD rating and the following ratios:  current ratio, debt 
to asset ratio, gross profit to total liabilities ratio, the inverse debt coverage ratio, working 
capital to gross profit and funded debt to EBITDA  (A. M. Featherstone 2017). 
 Results showed that financial ratio information gathered today does forecast PD 
ratings up to three years in the future.  Current ratio information does not forecast five years 
into the future, therefore there is a need to update financial information on a regular basis.  
Results indicate that debt to asset information is very important in predicting risk ratings.  
Given income volatility in the agriculture sector, agricultural lenders need to obtain up-to-
date financial information from their borrowers to accurately assess the risk of their 
portfolio (A. M. Featherstone 2017). 
2.2 Summary  
 Credit scoring has greatly influenced the finance industry by allowing lenders to 
make fast, objective decisions.  Lending institutes developed scorecards which are used to 
make loan approval, pricing and risk rating decisions. There is room for the agricultural 
lending industry to have more consistent scorecard and risk rating models.   
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CHAPTER III:  METHODS 
When evaluating delinquencies, there are many factors to consider.  This thesis will 
use regression analysis to evaluate several variables to determine if they impact Farm 
Credit Express delinquency rates.  A logistic regression model will be used because the 
dependent variable is binary. 
3.1 Variable Selection 
Selecting the variables is the first step to developing a regression model.  This 
thesis is evaluating FCE delinquencies, therefore the dependent variable is whether the loan 
has been greater than 30 days past due at least once during the last four years.  Factors that 
are expected to predict delinquencies are used as independent variables in the regression 
analysis.  The variables are identified in Table 3.1 and then further described below.  
Table 3.1:  Variables Used in Regression Model  
 
 
Dummy Variable for Delinquencies – 0 represents no delinquencies over 30 days and 1 
means that the loan has been over 30 days delinquent at least once during the last four 
years.    
Category Variable
Dependent Dummy variable for delinquencies
Independent Total AgChoice Borrowing
Original Loan Amount
Dummy Variable for Part Time or Full Time Farmer
CBI Score
AgScore
Dummy Variable for FCE Only Loan
13 
 
Original Loan Amount – amount of loan when it was originated.  This variable was 
chosen because it seems that smaller loans are more delinquent than larger loans.  
Total AgChoice Borrowing – total dollar value of AgChoice lending exposure to a 
specific borrower.  Often this includes multiple loans.  This variable was chosen as it seems 
borrowers with less exposure to AgChoice are more often delinquent.  
Dummy Variable Farming Segment – 0 is part time farmer and 1 is full time farmer.  
This variable was chosen to determine if a certain segment of our portfolio has more risk 
than the other.  It is expected that full time farmers will be more delinquent than part time 
farmers considering the volatility in commodity markets.  
CBI Score – credit bureau score from Experian.  This variable was chosen because the CBI 
score is utilized in the AgScore scoring model for FCE loans.  It is expected that borrowers 
with a higher CBI Score are less likely to be delinquent.  
AgScore – score from the Fair Isaac Scoring Model developed for Farm Credit 
Associations.  This variable was chosen because a borrower’s AgScore determines 
approval of an FCE loan.  Currently, the minimum cutoff score is 160.  The variables used 
by the FCE program to generate an AgScore include borrower’s age, CBI score, loan 
amount, and years in business.  It is expected that higher AgScores will predict lower 
delinquencies.  
Dummy Variable for FCE Only –   1 are borrowers that only have an FCE loan and 0 are 
borrowers that have an FCE loan but also have other loans with AgChoice.  This variable 
was chosen to determine if FCE only loans are more likely to be delinquent.  It is expected 
that FCE only loans are more likely to be delinquent.  
14 
 
3.2 Regression Model 
After the variables are selected, data are collected and the equation is estimated.  
Below is the estimated equation: 
ln(ρ/(1- ρ)) = B0 + B1*TotalAgChoiceBorrowing + B2*OrignalLoanAmount + 
B3*FarmingSegment + B4*CBIScore + B5*AgScore + B6*FCEOnly 
 
Delinquencies is a dummy variable where 0 represents no delinquencies over 30 days and 1 
represents the loan has been over 30 days delinquent at least once in the last four years.  Total 
AgChoice Borrowing is the total dollar value of loans a customer has borrowed from 
AgChoice.  The Original Loan Amount is the starting balance of the loan.  The Farming 
Segment is a dummy variable where 0 is part time farmer and 1 is full time farmer and the 
CBI Score is a borrower’s credit bureau score from Experian.  The AgScore is a borrower’s 
score from the Fair Isaac Scoring Model.  The FCE Only is a binary variable where 1 are 
borrowers with only FCE loans and 0 are borrowers who have an FCE loan but also have 
other loans with AgChoice.  
Once the model has been developed, a computer regression package (Gretl 2017) is 
used to estimate the equation.  Once the analysis has been completed using Gretl, the 





CHAPTER IV:  DATA 
4.1 Data 
The data for this thesis were collected from AgChoice’s existing loan portfolio.  
The data include the status of 15,640 loans as of January 31, 2018.  The loans were 
originated between February 25, 2011 and January 31, 2018.  Of the 15,640 loans, 2,896 or 
18.52% were originated through the Farm Credit Express program.  Of the 2,896 FCE 
loans, 1,899 were FCE only loans meaning the borrowers had no other lending relationship 
with AgChoice outside of FCE.   
In the data set, a loan is considered delinquent if it has gone over 30 days past due 
on the loan system.  The data set does not indicate how many times a loan has been over 30 
days past due, just that it has been delinquent at least one time.  Table 4.1 below shows the 
number of loans in the data set along with the percent of delinquencies.  
Table 4.1: Summary Loan Delinquencies  
 
Given the thesis is evaluating FCE delinquencies, only the data for the 2,896 FCE 
loans were used in the Gretl regression model.  Fifty-two loans were removed from the data 
set because of incomplete information.  Table 4.2 provides some key statistics on the 2,844 
FCE loans that were used in the Gretl regression model.  For the dummy variables, the 
table shows that 62% of the 2,844 loans are full time farmers and 66% are FCE only loans 
(no other loans with AgChoice).  The dummy variables do not have a minimum, maximum 
Category Number of Loans
Number of Loans 
w/delinquencies over 




All Loans 15,640          501 3.20%
Non-FCE Loans 12,744          362 2.84%
FCE Loans 2,896            139 4.80%
FCE Only Loans 1,899            127 6.69%
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or a standard deviation.  For the Total AgChoice Borrowing variable, the minimum is $0.  
It is possible to have a $0 Total AgChoice Borrowing if the loan is in non-accrual status 
and has been written off of the loan system.  There is one loan with a $0 Total AgChoice 
Borrowing in the FCE data set.   
 Average Total AgChoice Borrowing for borrowers with FCE loans is $258,490 but 
the median is only $34,971 which indicates the majority of our FCE loans are to borrowers 
with less than $50,000 of exposure.  Average and median CBI Score and AgScore are 
similar.  
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics of FCE Loans used in Gretl Regression 
 
  
Variable Average Median Deviation Minimum Maximum
TotalAgChoiceBorrowing $258,490 $39,514 $569,720 $0 $7,978,500
OriginalLoanAmount $34,971 $24,768 $34,625 $2,735 $340,270
FarmingSegment 62% - - - -
CBIScore 757 762 41 550 844




4.2 Expected Signs 
Table 4.3 outlines the expected signs and descriptions of the regression model equation. 
Table 4.3: Expected Coefficient Signs and Variable Description 
 
The coefficient β1, Total AgChoice Borrowing, is expected to be negative because 
as total loan exposure increases it is expected there will be less delinquencies because 
typically, more analysis is completed and there is more oversight on the account.  β2, the 
coefficient for Original Loan Amount, is expected to be negative with the expectations that 
borrowers are more likely to pay larger loans on time.  For the Farming Segment, 
coefficient β3 is expected to be positive where the dummy variable, 0 is part time farmer 
and 1 is full-time farmer.  The coefficient is expected to be positive because part time 
farmers typically have off-farm income that provides a more stable income source.  It is 
expected that full-time farmers who have more income volatility due to variability in 
commodity prices would have more delinquencies.  
 The coefficient β4, CBI Score, is expected to be negative indicating that individuals 
with a higher CBI score have a lower risk of delinquencies.  AgScore, coefficient β5 is also 
expected to be negative signifying that as a borrower’s AgScore increases, the probability 
of delinquency decreases.  Finally, the coefficient β6, FCE Only, is expected to be positive 
Coefficient Variable Expected Sign Variable Description
β1 TotalAgChoiceBorrowing - Total AgChoice Borrowering
β2 OrignalLoanAmount - Original Loan Amount
β3 FarmingSegment + Dummy Variable for Part Time or Full Time Farmer
β4 CBIScore - Credit Bureau Score from Experian
β5 AgScore - Score from Fair Isaac Scoring Model
β6 FCEOnly + Dummy Variable for Borrowers that have FCE Only Loans
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given that borrowers who have only FCE loans are more likely to be delinquent than 
borrowers who have an additional lending relationship with AgChoice.  
4.3 Summary 
The data section summarizes the data collected and utilized in the regression model.  It also 
includes hypotheses for the regression model output by predicting the signs for the 







CHAPTER V:  RESULTS 
 This chapter evaluates the results from the regression model which was described in 
previous chapters.  Table 5.1 shows the regression output.  Farm Credit Express loans with 
a delinquency within the last four years were used as the dependent variable.  All of the 
signs matched the hypothesized signs except for the farming segment coefficient, which is 
negative, and the original loan amount coefficient, which is positive.   
 After estimating the model with the proposed variables, it was suspected that the 
original model may have multicollinearity because CBI Score impacts a borrowers 
AgScore.  The model was re-run twice, once without CBI Score as a variable and once 
without AgScore as a variable.  The results were different and confirmed multicollinearity.  
Therefore, the final model does not include AgScore as a variable (Table 5.1).   
5.1 Regression Results 
Table 5.1: Regression Output 
 
 The Total AgChoice Borrowing coefficient is negative and indicates that as a 
borrower’s Total AgChoice Borrowing increases, the risk of delinquencies decreases.  With 
a p-value of 0.0096, this variable is statistically significant at the 1% significant level.  
Slope is the change in probability of the dependent variable when the independent variable 
Coefficient Std. Error z Slope p-value
Constant 9.0337 1.58501 5.699 - <0.0001 ***
TotalAgChoiceBorrowing -2.19E-06 8.46E-07 -2.59 -4.95E-08 0.0096 ***
OriginalLoanAmount 8.27E-06 2.72E-06 3.036 1.87E-07 0.0024 ***
FarmingSegment -0.312646 0.192219 -1.627 -7.33E-03 0.1038
CBIScore -0.017202 0.00210589 -8.169 -3.89E-04 <0.0001 ***
FCEOnly 1.08215 0.33522 3.228 0.0216713 0.0012 ***
R-squared Adjusted R-squared 0.110.12
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is changed by one unit while holding all other variables at their mean.  For every $10,000 
increase in Total AgChoice Borrowing, borrowers are .05% less likely to default.  Figure 
5.1 shows the change in Probability of Default (chance of delinquencies) as Total 
AgChoice Borrowing increases while all other variables are held at their mean.  
Figure 5.1: Impact of Total AgChoice Borrowing on Probability of Default 
 
The coefficient for Original Loan Amount is positive, which indicates as loan 
amounts increase, there is more likely to be a delinquency.  Note that this is a different sign 
than the hypothesis for this coefficient.  The positive coefficient for Original Loan Amount 
can be rationalized that as loan size increases, so does payment size.  For loans that are set 
up on annual payments to match cash flow from the farming operation, it is reasonable that 
borrowers may default on a larger annual payment versus a smaller payment.  Original 
Loan Amount is statistically significant at the 1% level with a p-value of .0024.  For every 
$10,000 increase in loan amount borrowers are 0.19% more likely to default.  Figure 5.2 
shows the change in Probability of Default (chance of delinquencies) as Original Loan 
Amount increases while all other variables are held at their mean.  Figure 5.3 shows the 
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range of original loan amounts for the 139 delinquent FCE loans. Fifty percent of the 
delinquencies were under $25,000. 




Figure 5.3: Original Loan Amount of Delinquent Loans 
 
 The coefficient for Farming Segment is negative.  Since this is a dummy variable 
where 0 is part time farmer and 1 is full time farmer, the negative coefficient indicates that 
if you are a full time farmer you are less likely to be delinquent than a part time farmer.  
Full time farmers are .73% less likely to default than part time farmers.  Figure 5.4 shows 
the change in Probability of Default (chance of delinquencies) as percentage of Full Time 
Farmer increases while all other variables are held at their mean.  This coefficient did not 
match the hypothesized sign. The farming segment negative coefficient can be rationalized 
as part time farmers who borrow through Farm Credit Express are probably taking out 
small loans and are more likely to have no other lending relationship with AgChoice 
compared to full-time farmers.  Of the 2,896 FCE loans, 1,114 loans were made to part 
time farmers.  Of those 1,114 FCE loans to part-time farmers, only 190 borrowers had 
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additional loans with AgChoice.  In the case of cash flow shortage, it is reasonable that 
part-time farmers would choose to pay other creditors, like their primary mortgage holder, 
before making payments on a Farm Credit Express financed piece of equipment.  With a p-
value of 0.1038, this variable is not statistically significant.  Figure 5.5 shows the 
breakdown of farming segment for the 139 delinquent FCE loans.   





Figure 5.5: Percent of Delinquencies per Farming Segment 
 
 The coefficient for CBI Score is -0.017, which indicates that as CBI Score increases 
risk for delinquency decreases.  CBI score has a very small p-value and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  For every one point increase in CBI score borrowers are .04% 
less likely to default.  Figure 5.6 shows the change in Probability of Default (chance of 
delinquencies) as CBI Score increases while all other variables are held at their mean.  
Internally, AgChoice has a minimum CBI cutoff of 700.  If the CBI score is under 700, an 
additional 0.25% is added to the interest rate margin.  Of the 139 FCE loans that were 
delinquent, 36 loans, or 25.90% had a CBI score less than 700.   
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Figure 5.6: Impact of CBI Score on Probability of Default 
 
Figure 5.7: CBI Score and AgScore of FCE Loans with Delinquencies 
 
  The AgScore variable was not included in the final model.  Figure 5.7 above shows the 
AgScore versus CBI score of the FCE loans that were delinquent at least once during the 
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past four years.  Note, that seven of the 139 delinquent FCE loans had a CBI Score of 0.  
These seven loans were not included in the scatter plot.  The shape of the scatter plot 
indicates multicollinearity between AgScore and CBI Score.  
 As the chart indicates, loans that went delinquent had a variety of AgScores.  
Currently, the AgScore cutoff for FCE approvals is 160.  Of the 139 loans, only 1, or 
0.72% had a score below 160.  Currently, AgChoice’s AgScore cutoff for approval of 
internal loans that are not processed through the FCE program is 170.  Of the 139 loans that 
were delinquent, 26 loans, or 18.7% had an AgScore less than 170.   
 The coefficient of the final variable, FCE Only Loans, was positive at 1.08.  This 
variable is statistically significant at the 1% level with a p-value of 0.0012.  Figure 5.8 
shows the change in Probability of Default (chance of delinquencies) as the Percent FCE 
Only Loans increases while all other variables are held at their mean.   





Logistic regression was used to determine which independent variables had a 
statistical impact on the dependent variable (FCE delinquencies). Four of the five 




CHAPTER VI:  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE ANALYSIS 
6.1 Future Analysis  
After researching, collecting data and estimating the regression, it is evident that 
there are other areas that can be addressed in future research.  The data for this study were 
based on loans that went over 30 days delinquent at least once in four years.  These data 
were chosen because they were readily available from AgChoice’s current loan system.  
The current procedure for servicing delinquent loans is to send past due letters at 20 days 
delinquent and to make at least one phone call to try and collect before 30 days delinquent.  
Therefore, there may be loans that reach 29 days past due which are a servicing burden to 
field staff that are not represented in the data for this thesis project.  Future research to 
evaluate FCE loans at varying days past due would be beneficial to further evaluate the 
servicing burden on field staff.  
While several of the variables were statistically significant, there may be other 
variables that better predict delinquency.  Some other variables to consider would be type 
of equipment purchased (new versus used), primary industry of borrower (dairy, swine, 
poultry, etc.), borrower’s location and frequency of payment.  The Farm Credit Express 
program finances a lot of used equipment because other dealer financing options like 
John Deere Financial may not.  By including a variable for type of equipment purchased, 
AgChoice could determine if there is more risk in financing used equipment versus new.  
A variable for borrower’s primary industry could help determine if one agricultural 
industry has more risk than another.  A borrower’s location could determine if we have 
more risk for delinquencies in certain areas of our geographic territory.  Finally, 
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frequency of payment could determine if there is more risk for delinquency with annual 
payments, versus quarterly or monthly payments.  
6.2 Recommendations  
 Based on the results from the estimated regression model, there are several 
recommendations that AgChoice could consider to manage risk in its Farm Credit 
Express portfolio:  add a minimum CBI cutoff requirement for FCE approvals, price 
differentially for FCE only borrowers, and institute a minimum FCE loan amount.  
 Considering that the CBI Score variable is statistically significant at the 1% level, 
it is a good predictor of delinquencies.  AgChoice could implement the same minimum 
CBI score that it has for internal loan applications, which is a 700 cutoff.  Of the 2,896 
FCE loans in the data set, 335 loans, or 11.57% had a CBI score below 700.  Another 
option is to continue to approve loans based on AgScore but require additional interest 
rate margin for loans with a CBI score under 700 to compensate AgChoice for the 
additional risk in the account.  The amount of additional margin could be calculated using 
probability of default.  Another option to compensate for additional risk is to require an 
additional upfront origination fee for borrowers with a CBI score below 700.  
 Based on the data, FCE only loans are more likely to default than borrowers who 
have additional non-FCE loans with AgChoice.  To compensate for this risk, AgChoice 
could price FCE only loans higher than for FCE borrowers who have additional business 
with AgChoice.  It is recognized that FCE only borrowers may be AgChoice prospects 
and an FCE loan is a good lead-in product for additional financing.  Therefore, the 
recommendation is not to price FCE only loans out of the market but consider adding 
additional margin to compensate for the risk.  
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 The final recommendation is to consider implementing a minimum loan amount.  
While the variable for original loan amount did not indicate that smaller loans are more 
delinquent, when reviewing Figure 5.1, 50% of the loans were under $25,00.  Creating a 
minimum loan amount of $25,000 would reduce number of loans in the program and 
reduce loan volume.  Of the 2,896 FCE loans in the data set, 1,455 loans, or 50.24% had 
an original loan amount under $25,000.  These 1,455 loans original volume totaled 
$20,904,111, which is 20.6% of the 2,986 total FCE loans original volume of 
$101,338,293.  This recommendation would require additional research to determine if 
much additional business comes from FCE loans under $25,000.   
 It is noted that AgChoice partners with Mid-Atlantic Farm Credit on the Farm 
Credit Express program, so to implement these recommendations would require all 
associations that participate in the FCE program to agree.  
6.3 Conclusions 
This thesis research was prompted by the servicing AgChoice’s field staff does to 
manage Farm Credit Express delinquencies.  Researching and collecting data for this thesis 
project has prompted AgChoice management to evaluate options for managing FCE 
delinquencies.  In March 2018, AgChoice implemented a new procedure for managing 
FCE only delinquencies.  This is for borrowers who only have an FCE loan and have no 
other business with AgChoice.  If an FCE only loan goes over 30 days past due, branch 
staff have the ability to transfer this loan to AgChoice’s Special Asset Group (“SAG”) for 
collection and servicing.  Historically, the branch would manage delinquencies until the 
loan was considered seriously delinquent (nearing 90 days past due) and the loan was 
transferred to SAG for foreclosure.  Now, branch staff have the option at 30 days 
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delinquent to transfer the account to a SAG loan officer to manage the servicing.  Based on 
this procedure change, the overall thesis project is considered a success by allowing field 
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